Vilnius Summit Communiqué (part one)

Vilnius Summit Communiqué (part one)

Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius 11 July 2023

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm

The NATO Invitee associates itself with this Communiqué.

1.           We, the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Alliance, bound by shared values of individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, have gathered in Vilnius as war continues on the European continent, to reaffirm our enduring transatlantic bond, unity, cohesion, and solidarity at a critical time for our security and international peace and stability.  NATO is a defensive Alliance.  It is the unique, essential and indispensable transatlantic forum to consult, coordinate and act on all matters related to our individual and collective security.  We reaffirm our iron-clad commitment to defend each other and every inch of Allied territory at all times, protect our one billion citizens, and safeguard our freedom and democracy, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.  We will continue to ensure our collective defence from all threats, no matter where they stem from, based on a 360-degree approach, to fulfil NATO’s three core tasks of deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.  We adhere to international law and to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and are committed to upholding the rules-based international order.  This Summit marks a milestone in strengthening our Alliance.

2.           We warmly welcome President Zelenskyy to the inaugural meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council.  We look forward to our valuable exchanges with the Heads of State and Government of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea, as well as the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission at this Summit.  We also welcome the engagements with the Foreign Ministers of Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, and with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as we continue to consult closely on the implementation of NATO’s tailored support measures.

3.           We welcome Finland as the newest member of our Alliance. This is an historic step for Finland and for NATO. For many years, we worked closely as partners; we now stand together as Allies. NATO membership makes Finland safer, and NATO stronger.

4.           We reaffirm our commitment to NATO’s Open Door policy and to Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. Every nation has the right to choose its own security arrangements. We look forward to welcoming Sweden as a full member of the Alliance and, in this regard, welcome the agreement reached between the NATO Secretary General, the President of Türkiye, and the Prime Minister of Sweden.

5.           Peace in the Euro-Atlantic area has been shattered.  The Russian Federation has violated the norms and principles that contributed to a stable and predictable European security order.  The Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.  Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, is the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of our citizens and to international peace and prosperity.  The threats we face are global and interconnected.

6.           Strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks define our broader security environment.  Conflict, fragility and instability in Africa and the Middle East directly affect our security and the security of our partners.  The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.  We remain open to constructive engagement with the PRC, including to build reciprocal transparency, with a view to safeguarding the Alliance’s security interests.  We continue to be confronted by cyber, space, hybrid and other asymmetric threats, and by the malicious use of emerging and disruptive technologies.

7.           Russia bears full responsibility for its illegal, unjustifiable, and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, which has gravely undermined Euro-Atlantic and global security and for which it must be held fully accountable.  We continue to condemn in the strongest terms Russia’s blatant violations of international law, the Charter of the United Nations, and OSCE commitments and principles.  We do not and will never recognise Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexations, including Crimea.  There can be no impunity for Russian war crimes and other atrocities, such as attacks against civilians and the destruction of civilian infrastructure that deprives millions of Ukrainians of basic human services.  All those responsible must be held accountable for violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law, particularly against Ukraine’s civilian population, including the forced deportation of children and conflict-related sexual violence.  The destruction of the Kakhovka dam highlights the brutal consequences of the war started by Russia.  Russia’s war has had a profound impact on the environment, nuclear safety, energy and food security, the global economy, and the welfare of billions of people around the world.  Allies are working to enable exports of Ukrainian grain and actively support international efforts to alleviate the global food crisis.

8.           Russia must immediately stop this illegal war of aggression, cease its use of force against Ukraine, and completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its forces and equipment from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, extending to its territorial waters.  We urge all countries not to provide any kind of assistance to Russia’s aggression and condemn all those who are actively facilitating Russia’s war.  Belarus’ support has been instrumental as it continues to provide its territory and infrastructure to allow Russian forces to attack Ukraine and sustain Russia’s aggression.  In particular Belarus, but also Iran, must end their complicity with Russia and return to compliance with international law.

9.           We welcome the strong support in the UN General Assembly for efforts to promote a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in Ukraine.  We welcome and support President Zelenskyy’s commitment in setting out the principles for such a peace through his Peace Formula.  We are committed to achieving a just and lasting peace that upholds the principles of the UN Charter, in particular sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence.  We underline that this cannot be realised without Russia’s complete and unconditional withdrawal.  While we have called on Russia to engage constructively in credible negotiations with Ukraine, Russia has not shown any genuine openness to a just and lasting peace.

10.         We reaffirm our unwavering solidarity with the government and people of Ukraine in the heroic defence of their nation, their land, and our shared values.  We fully support Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter.  We remain steadfast in our commitment to further step up political and practical support to Ukraine as it continues to defend its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and will continue our support for as long as it takes.  We welcome efforts of all Allies and partners engaged in providing support to Ukraine.

11.         We fully support Ukraine’s right to choose its own security arrangements.  Ukraine’s future is in NATO.  We reaffirm the commitment we made at the 2008 Summit in Bucharest that Ukraine will become a member of NATO, and today we recognise that Ukraine’s path to full Euro-Atlantic integration has moved beyond the need for the Membership Action Plan.  Ukraine has become increasingly interoperable and politically integrated with the Alliance, and has made substantial progress on its reform path.  In line with the 1997 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine and the 2009 Complement, Allies will continue to support and review Ukraine’s progress on interoperability as well as additional democratic and security sector reforms that are required.  NATO Foreign Ministers will regularly assess progress through the adapted Annual National Programme.  The Alliance will support Ukraine in making these reforms on its path towards future membership.  We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met.

12.         The security of Ukraine is of great importance to Allies and the Alliance.  To support Ukraine’s further integration with NATO, today we have agreed a substantial package of expanded political and practical support.  We have decided to establish the NATO-Ukraine Council, a new joint body where Allies and Ukraine sit as equal members to advance political dialogue, engagement, cooperation, and Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO.  It will provide for joint consultations, decision-making, and activities, and will also serve as a crisis consultation mechanism between NATO and Ukraine.

13.         The continued delivery of urgently needed non-lethal assistance to Ukraine by NATO through the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) remains a priority.  Since the Madrid Summit, Allies and partners have committed over 500 million Euros to the CAP.  To support Ukraine’s deterrence and defence in the short, medium, and long term, we have agreed today to further develop the CAP into a multi-year programme for Ukraine.  The assistance provided will help rebuild the Ukrainian security and defence sector and transition Ukraine towards full interoperability with NATO.  Allies will continue to fund the CAP in a sustained and predictable way.  We highly welcome and encourage partner contributions.

14.         Russia has increased its multi-domain military build-up and presence in the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean Sea regions, and maintains significant military capabilities in the Arctic.  Russia’s more assertive posture, novel military capabilities, and provocative activities, including near NATO borders, as well as its large-scale no-notice and snap exercises, continue to threaten the security of the Euro-Atlantic area.  In the High North, its capability to disrupt Allied reinforcements and freedom of navigation across the North Atlantic is a strategic challenge to the Alliance.  NATO and Allies will continue to undertake necessary, calibrated, and coordinated activities, including by exercising relevant plans.

15.         Russia’s deepening military integration with Belarus, including the deployment of advanced Russian military capabilities and military personnel in Belarus, has implications for regional stability and the defence of the Alliance.  NATO will remain vigilant and further monitor developments closely, in particular the potential deployment of so-called private military companies to Belarus.  We call on Belarus to stop its malign activities against its neighbours, to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to abide by international law.

16.         Russia is modernising its nuclear forces, including its large stockpile of theatre-range weapons, and expanding its novel and disruptive dual-capable delivery systems.  It is unacceptable that Russia uses such dual-capable systems to attack civilians and critical civilian infrastructure in Ukraine.  We condemn Russia’s announced intention to deploy nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable systems on Belarusian territory, which further demonstrates how Russia’s repeated actions undermine strategic stability and overall security in the Euro-Atlantic area.  We condemn Russia’s irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and coercive nuclear signalling.  We recall the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear Weapons States issued on 3 January 2022 on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races.  We call on Russia to recommit – in words and deeds – to the principles enshrined in that Statement.

17.         Russia’s actions demonstrate a posture of strategic intimidation and underline the continued need for NATO to monitor all of these developments and adapt its posture as necessary.  Allies will continue to work closely together to address the threats and challenges posed by Russia and reiterate that any use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear weapons by Russia would be met with severe consequences.

18.         Russia has intensified its hybrid actions against NATO Allies and partners, including through proxies.  This includes interference in democratic processes, political and economic coercion, widespread disinformation campaigns, malicious cyber activities, and illegal and disruptive activities of Russian intelligence services.  We are enhancing the tools at our disposal to counter Russian hybrid actions and will ensure that the Alliance and Allies are prepared to deter and defend against hybrid attacks.

19.         We seek stability and predictability in the Euro-Atlantic area and between NATO and Russia.  NATO does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia.  In light of its hostile policies and actions, we cannot consider Russia to be our partner.  Any change in our relationship depends on Russia halting its aggressive behaviour and fully complying with international law.  We remain willing to keep open channels of communication with Moscow to manage and mitigate risks, prevent escalation, and increase transparency.  At the same time, we will continue to consult on and assess the implications of Russia’s policies and actions for our security, and respond to Russian threats and hostile actions in a united and responsible way.

20.         We categorically reject and condemn terrorism in the strongest possible terms.  Countering terrorism in all its forms and manifestations is essential to our collective defence.  NATO’s role in the fight against terrorism contributes to all three core tasks of the Alliance and is integral to the Alliance’s 360-degree approach to deterrence and defence.  Allies will continue to fight this threat with determination, resolve, and in solidarity.   As part of a broader effort to better respond collectively to this threat, we will further develop Allies’ capabilities, and continue to engage with the Global Coalition to Defeat Da’esh and with partner countries in order to support their efforts and to help them build their capacity to counter terrorism.  NATO will also continue to engage, as appropriate, with other international actors to ensure added value and complementarity. 

21.         Terrorist organisations threaten the security of our populations, forces and territory.  They have expanded their networks, enhanced their capabilities and invested in new technologies to improve their reach and lethality.  We will continue to deter, defend and respond to threats and challenges posed by terrorist groups, based on a combination of prevention, protection and denial measures.  We have today tasked the Council in permanent session to update NATO’s Policy Guidelines and Action Plan on Counter-Terrorism, and reassess, in consultation with our regional partners, the areas where NATO can provide civil-military assistance to partners in this field.  Our approach to terrorism, and its causes, is in accordance with international law and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and upholds all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions on the fight against terrorism.

22.         NATO’s southern neighbourhood, particularly the Middle East, North Africa and Sahel regions, faces interconnected security, demographic, economic, and political challenges.  These are aggravated by the impact of climate change, fragile institutions, health emergencies, and food insecurity.  This situation provides fertile ground for the proliferation of non-state armed groups, including terrorist organisations.  It also enables destabilising and coercive interference by strategic competitors.  Russia is fuelling tensions and instability across these regions.  Pervasive instability results in violence against civilians, including conflict-related sexual violence, as well as attacks against cultural property and environmental damage.  It contributes to forced displacement, fuelling human trafficking and irregular migration.  These trends pose serious transnational and humanitarian challenges and have a disproportionate impact on women, children, and minorities.  In response to the profound implications of these threats and challenges within and in the vicinity of the Euro-Atlantic area, we have today tasked the North Atlantic Council in permanent session to launch a comprehensive and deep reflection on existing and emerging threats and challenges, and opportunities for engagements with our partner nations, international organisations, and other relevant actors in the region, to be presented by our next Summit in 2024.

23.         The People’s Republic of China’s stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.  The PRC employs a broad range of political, economic, and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power, while remaining opaque about its strategy, intentions and military build-up.  The PRC’s malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation target Allies and harm Alliance security.  The PRC seeks to control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic materials and supply chains.  It uses its economic leverage to create strategic dependencies and enhance its influence.  It strives to subvert the rules-based international order, including in the space, cyber and maritime domains.

24.         We remain open to constructive engagement with the PRC, including to build reciprocal transparency, with a view to safeguarding the Alliance’s security interests.  We are working together responsibly, as Allies, to address the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security and ensure NATO’s enduring ability to guarantee the defence and security of Allies.  We are boosting our shared awareness, enhancing our resilience and preparedness, and protecting against the PRC’s coercive tactics and efforts to divide the Alliance.  We will stand up for our shared values and the rules-based international order, including freedom of navigation.

25.         The deepening strategic partnership between the PRC and Russia and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests.  We call on the PRC to play a constructive role as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to condemn Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, to abstain from supporting Russia’s war effort in any way, to cease amplifying Russia’s false narrative blaming Ukraine and NATO for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and to adhere to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.  We particularly call on the PRC to act responsibly and refrain from providing any lethal aid to Russia.

26.         In 2014, at the Wales Summit Allied Heads of State and Government agreed the Defence Investment Pledge.  Since then Allies have made remarkable progress and all have increased their defence spending, developed further their forces and capabilities, and have contributed to Allied operations, missions and activities.  However, as the Strategic Concept sets out, our nations are now facing more profound security threats and challenges than at any time since the end of the Cold War.

27.         Consistent with our obligations under Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, we make an enduring commitment to invest at least 2% of our Gross Domestic Product (GDP) annually on defence.  We do so recognising more is needed urgently to sustainably meet our commitments as NATO Allies, including to fulfil longstanding major equipment requirements and the NATO Capability Targets, to resource NATO’s new defence plans and force model, as well as to contribute to NATO operations, missions and activities.  We affirm that in many cases, expenditure beyond 2% of GDP will be needed in order to remedy existing shortfalls and meet the requirements across all domains arising from a more contested security order.

28.         We commit to invest at least 20% of our defence budgets on major equipment, including related Research and Development.  We recognise this should be met in conjunction with a minimum of 2% of GDP annual defence expenditure.  We need to maintain our technological edge, and continue to modernise and reform our forces and capabilities, including through the integration of innovative technologies.

29.         We commit to contribute the necessary forces, capabilities and resources to the full range of NATO operations, missions and activities.  This includes meeting requirements for deterrence and defence, providing the forces needed to implement NATO’s defence plans and contribute to NATO crisis management operations.  Allies will ensure that our forces are ready and have the necessary personnel, equipment, training, spares, logistics, infrastructure, and stockpiles.  We commit to improve the interoperability of our national forces, including through transparent compliance with, and further development of, NATO standards and doctrines.

30.         To have the necessary capabilities, the Alliance requires a strong and capable defence industry, with resilient supply chains.  A strong defence industry across the Alliance, including a stronger defence industry in Europe and greater defence industrial cooperation within Europe and across the Atlantic, remains essential for delivering the required capabilities.  Furthermore, consistent with our commitments, obligations and processes, we will reduce and eliminate, as appropriate, obstacles to defence trade and investment among Allies.

31.         NATO is the foundation of our collective defence.  NATO’s key purpose and greatest responsibility is to ensure our collective defence, against all threats, from all directions.  NATO will continue to fulfil three core tasks: deterrence and defence; crisis prevention and management; and cooperative security.  These are complementary to ensure the collective defence and security of all Allies.

32.         Deterrence and defence are at the heart of the Alliance, underpinned by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and an enduring transatlantic bond.  We are modernising NATO for a new era of collective defence.  We are united in our commitment and resolve to prevail against any aggressor and defend every inch of Allied territory.

33.         Guided by our sovereign decisions, and in response to the threats we face, we remain vigilant and stand together in solidarity ensuring a substantial and persistent presence of our military forces across the Alliance on land, in the air and at sea, in line with our 360-degree approach.  NATO’s deterrence and defence posture is based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities, complemented by space and cyber capabilities.  It is defensive, proportionate and fully in line with our international commitments.  We will employ military and non-military tools in a proportionate, coherent and integrated way to respond to all threats to our security in the manner, timing and in the domain of our choosing.

34.         In response to a radically changed security environment, we are strengthening NATO’s collective defence, against all threats, from all directions.  We cannot discount the possibility of an attack against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity.  Since 2014, and in particular at the 2022 Madrid Summit, we have taken decisions to strengthen our posture and set a clear trajectory for accelerated military adaptation.  Today, we have agreed significant measures to further enhance NATO’s deterrence and defence posture in all domains, including strengthening forward defences and the Alliance’s ability to rapidly reinforce any Ally that comes under threat. We will fully implement these measures and deny any potential adversary any possible opportunities for aggression.  We have:

• Put in place a new generation of regional defence plans, building on our existing strategic and domain-specific plans.  Together this family of plans will significantly improve our ability and readiness to deter and defend against any threats, including on short or no notice, and ensure timely reinforcement of all Allies, in line with our 360-degree approach.  To a greater extent than at any time since the end of the Cold War, the planning for our collective defence will be fully coherent with the planning for our forces, posture management, capabilities, and command and control.  We have committed to fully resource and regularly exercise these plans to be prepared for high-intensity and multi-domain collective defence.

• Agreed that our defence plans are the main driver for the organisation of our forces and the specific military requirements NATO asks of them, allowing us to respond faster and at a greater scale.  With the new NATO Force Model, agreed at the Madrid Summit, Allies are delivering a larger pool of dedicated combat-capable forces, including forces at high readiness, improving our military responsiveness, and harnessing regional expertise and geographic proximity.  We are also establishing a new multinational and multi-domain Allied Reaction Force, which will provide more options to respond swiftly to threats and crises in all directions.  We are committed to provide the necessary forces and capabilities in full.

• Agreed to strengthen NATO’s command and control, to ensure that it is sufficiently agile, resilient and staffed to execute our plans.  This will improve our ability to conduct exercises, to manage NATO’s posture in peacetime and in the transition to crisis and conflict, and to undertake command and control for the full spectrum of missions, including large-scale multi-domain operations for collective defence, conducted by SHAPE and its subordinate commands, including the three equally capable Joint Force Commands.

• Reaffirmed our decisions at the Madrid Summit to put in place additional robust in-place combat-ready forces on NATO’s Eastern Flank, to be scaled up from the existing battlegroups to brigade-size units where and when required, underpinned by credible rapidly available reinforcements, prepositioned equipment, and enhanced command and control.  The eight multinational battlegroups are now in place.  We will continue our efforts to implement these decisions, including by demonstrating the ability to scale up our military presence through robust live exercises across the Eastern Flank of the Alliance.  We welcome ongoing efforts by Allies to increase their presence on NATO’s Eastern Flank, which further adds to credible deterrence and defence.  All these forces demonstrate our resolve and readiness to defend every inch of Allied territory.

• Agreed to further improve the readiness, preparedness, and interoperability of NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence, in particular through regular training and rotational presence of modern air defence systems and capabilities across SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility, with an initial focus on the Eastern Flank, thereby strengthening our deterrence.

• Agreed to continue our work on multi-domain operations, enabled by NATO’s Digital Transformation, which further drives our military and technological advantage, strengthening the Alliance’s ability to operate decisively across the land, air, maritime, cyberspace and space domains.

35.         We welcome the rapid progress towards the full integration of Finland into NATO’s deterrence and defence, and have agreed to complete this process as soon as possible.

36.         We need a robust and resilient defence industry able to sustainably meet the need of significantly strengthened collective defence. We have endorsed a Defence Production Action Plan, and its action items.  This Plan will ensure long-term NATO engagement across the Alliance based on the principles of transparency, equitable treatment and inclusive participation.  With this Plan, and in support of Allies’ own priorities, we are committed to leveraging the Alliance’s role as a convener, standard-setter, requirement setter and aggregator, and delivery enabler to promote sustainable defence industrial capacity.  This will be underpinned by a renewed and urgent focus on interoperability and improving materiel standardization to ensure that our forces can operate seamlessly together, with an initial focus on land munitions.  The Plan will ensure our understanding of defence industry across the Alliance, including small and medium size enterprises, help aggregate demand to meet NATO’s capability targets, encourage multinational cooperation and more agile procurement, and enhance transparency with industry.

37.         Our robust military capabilities are critical for NATO’s deterrence and defence.  We continue to invest more in advanced and interoperable capabilities across all domains, placing particular emphasis on combat capable, predominantly heavy, high-end forces and capabilities.  These will reflect the requirements of NATO’s defence plans and other tasks.  We will ensure that these capabilities are resourced to maintain the required high levels of readiness.  We continue to improve the deployability, interoperability, standardisation, responsiveness, force integration and support of our forces in order to conduct and sustain high intensity operations, including crisis response operations, in demanding environments.  The NATO Defence Planning Process plays a key role in the sharing of risks and responsibilities, and we reaffirm our commitment to providing our respective shares of the capabilities required by the Alliance to fulfil our three core tasks.  Our capability development plans will ensure that we maintain our technological edge, recognising the challenges and opportunities presented by emerging and disruptive technologies, while ensuring their timely integration.  We have also decided to significantly increase our stockpiles of certain battle-decisive munitions.

38.         We will continue to strengthen and regularly exercise the Alliance’s ability to rapidly reinforce any Ally that comes under threat.  Exercises are a key way of demonstrating the Alliance’s resolve and capability.  We are adapting and streamlining our decision-making processes and improving the effectiveness of our alert and response system.

39.         We will individually and collectively deliver the full range of forces, capabilities, plans, resources, assets and infrastructure needed for deterrence and defence, including for high-intensity, multi-domain warfighting against nuclear-armed peer-competitors.  Accordingly, we will strengthen training and exercises that simulate conventional and, for Allies concerned, a nuclear dimension of a crisis or conflict, facilitating greater coherence between conventional and nuclear components of NATO’s deterrence and defence posture across all domains and the entire spectrum of conflict.

40.         We have accelerated our efforts, both nationally and in NATO, to ensure the enablement of SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility, including logistics, and to improve our ability to support the reinforcement and sustainment of Allied forces into, across, and from the entire Alliance territory, including through prepositioning of ammunition and equipment.  As part of the enablement of SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility, we are taking forward our work on fuel supply distribution arrangements, as the timely provision of fuel to NATO’s military forces where required in Europe underpins the Alliance’s readiness and responsiveness.  We recognise that the changed security environment represents a more demanding challenge to the Alliance’s collective logistics and we will make political and military efforts to address this challenge, recognising that credible deterrence and defence relies on adequate logistics capability.  Effective military mobility is essential for enablement and further progress is required.  Efforts to ensure a coherent approach and synergies between NATO and the EU in the area of military mobility should be pursued.

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